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Abstract
We report an experiment investigating how concurrent verbal-
isation during a task can affect performance (a so-called “re-
activity” effect). Participants studied three-variable line graphs
while (a) concurrently thinking aloud or (b) silently studied the
graphs and provided an interpretation once they felt they had
understood it. Results showed that verbalisation hindered per-
formance significantly compared to the silent condition. To
support the claim that the act of verbalising was hindering
performance, competing explanations were also tested, which
confirmed thinking aloud as the most likely cause. This contra-
dicts claims by Ericsson and Simon (1993) that thinking aloud
reflects but does not affect performance and provides further
evidence that verbalising thought processes can hinder perfor-
mance.
Introduction
Arguably one of the most important advances to have oc-
curred during the cognitive revolution has been the attempt
to develop theoretical justifications and rigorous methods for
obtaining information about cognitive processes through the
analysis of verbal reports produced during their execution.
Although the use of personal reports to infer mental pro-
cesses has a long history, the approach has always remained
controversial, with critics arguing that data obtained from
them may be unreliable or that the methods themselves dis-
tort or react with the cognitive processes under investigation.
The employment of verbal reports was given a cognitive ba-
sis and justification by Ericsson and Simon (1993) and their
theory of protocol generation.
As a result of their analysis of the different types of ver-
balisation, the use of verbal protocol methods is now consid-
ered a legitimate approach for tracing thought processes and
being a valid source of data about the steps involved in prob-
lem solving and decision making (Wilson, 1994). Since the
original proposal, the think aloud method has been widely
adopted, resulting in a large body of research into the pro-
cesses underlying decision making, problem solving, text
comprehension, diagrammatic reasoning, writing, and vari-
ous other tasks (Crutcher, 1994).
The method considered by Ericsson and Simon (1993) as
being the most valuable and rigorous is the concurrent think
aloud method in which experiment participants are asked to
simply verbalise their thoughts while carrying out a task.
Ericsson and Simon (1993) claim that if appropriate instruc-
tions are given and followed carefully, the reports participants
provide are an accurate reflection of the thought sequence that
would have been followed if participants performed the task
silently.
Questions remain however concerning the possible reac-
tivity effects of thinking aloud while performing a task and a
number of recent studies have revealed that verbalising while
performing a task can hinder performance, challenging Eric-
sson and Simon’s (1993) claim that verbal reports are non-
reactive.
This area of research has primarily focused on tasks such as
face recognition and insight problem solving where the pro-
cesses involved in reaching a solution are not accessible to
the individual to report (Chin & Schooler, 2008). Schooler
and Engstler-Schooler (1990) investigated whether describ-
ing a previously seen face would later hinder participants’
ability to correctly recognise the face later. They found that
compared to a control group who did not describe the face,
those who did performed significantly worse in the recogni-
tion test. Schooler and Engstler-Schooler (1990) called this
effect “verbal overshadowing”, proposing that verbal over-
shadowing occurs when attention is directed to information
that can easily be verbalised and so eclipses information that
cannot easily be put into words.
Ericsson and Simon (1993) have challenged findings such
as these arguing that the method employed did not adhere
to guidelines of how protocols should be elicited. They
distinguish between different techniques employed to elicit
verbalisations—when participants are asked only to report
their thoughts (Type 1 verbalisations) and when participants
are asked to explain them (Type 3 verbalisations). Numerous
studies (e.g., Wilson and Hodges (1992); Wilson, Hodges,
and LaFleur (1995)) have reported reactivity effects but have
required participants to provide a reason for their decision
(e.g., “why do you prefer this painting over the other one?”)
which would elicit Type 3 verbalisations, a technique Erics-
son and Simon accept is prone to reactivity effects. This is
because when researchers ask “why?” questions, participants
are required to process information which they would nor-
mally not need to, thus altering their thought processes and
making the method susceptible to reactivity effects (Ericsson
& Simon, 1993). Therefore, there are only a handful of stud-
ies reporting reactivity effects when employing this method
which adhere to the criteria outlined for eliciting valid proto-
cols.
Despite this, there is a growing consensus that under cer-
tain circumstances, employing the verbal protocol method
may result in reactivity effects (e.g., Schooler, Ohlsson, and
Brooks (1993); Wilson (1994)). However, studies conducted
to investigate this research question have focused on tasks
where verbal overshadowing of information is likely to oc-
cur (e.g., insight problems). Although this research is useful
for identifying particular instances in which the think-aloud
method may be susceptible to reactivity effects, the question
remains whether these results generalise to tasks where in-
formation is more readily available for verbalisation. There
is a need therefore for a greater range of tasks to be tested
to determine whether reactivity effects are limited to tasks
where information may be difficult to verbalise, especially
considering the growth in areas this method has been applied
to (Wilson, 1994).
In addition, it has been assumed that it is the act of think-
ing aloud itself which results in reactivity effects. There is
the possibility of an alternative explanation however. When
employing the think aloud method, the experimenter must be
present with the participant, which may affect performance—
the widely investigated “social facilitation/inhibition effect”
(Zajonc, 1965; Rosenthal, 1976; Huguet, Galvaing, Monteil,
& Dumas, 1999).
One study which potentially indicates this could be the case
was conducted by de Vet and de Dreu (2007), who studied the
effects of concurrent verbalisation on creativity in a group set-
ting. They found that thinking aloud impaired performance,
particularly in individuals who were sensitive to other peo-
ple’s opinions of them. Although the authors concluded that
the presence of others played a role in the performance im-
pairments, it is difficult to generalise these results because the
large groups used in the study are not typical of the scenarios
used in the majority of verbal protocol studies.
Current experiment
The aim of this study is twofold. Firstly, we seek to determine
whether reactivity effects found in the literature are due to
the demands of thinking aloud or whether potential compet-
ing explanations (e.g., experimenter presence) could account
for this effect. Secondly, we also wish to investigate whether
reactivity effects are limited to the types of tasks investigated
in previous verbal overshadowing experiments by requiring
people to think aloud while performing a task in which infor-
mation is readily available for verbalisation.
To do this we employed a graph comprehension task for a
number of reasons. First, in such tasks the information be-
ing processed is readily available at all times, thereby reduc-
ing the burden on working memory and freeing up resources
for the interpretive task (Pinker, 1990). Second, previous re-
search into graph comprehension employing verbal protocols
(e.g., Ratwani, Trafton, & Boehm-Davis, 2008) has demon-
strated that such methods are able to provide a reliable trace
of the problem solving processes undertaken by users.
Finally, the graphs we employed, although widely used in
statistics to depict relationships between more than two vari-
ables, are relatively simple and constrain the interpretative
processes available to users. Evidence for this assertion is
provided by Halford, Baker, McCredden, and Bain (2005)
who manipulated the number of graphically displayed statis-
tical interactions participants were required to process. They
found performance for 2×2 problems (the type employed in
our task) was near perfect but a steep drop in performance
emerged when the graphical representation depicted 3 or 4
way interactions; consistent with processing capacity con-
straints.
Based on these criteria, one might expect no effect of con-
current verbalisation to be found in this task. However, in a
previous study in which we compared graph comprehension
assessed by written and verbal reports, we found the written
interpretation to be superior in terms of accuracy and detail
(Ali & Peebles, 2011). These findings did not reveal whether
the differences were a result of a facilitation produced by the
act of writing or a detriment from verbalising. The previous
study laid open the possibility that this task may be suscepti-
ble to reactivity effects. Therefore this study will attempt to
determine whether this is the case.
Assessing potential reactivity effects in a
comprehension task
To measure reactivity effects, the output from thinking aloud
is compared to that of a “silent” condition using dependent
measures such as number of correct responses and this is the
method adopted in this study. In problem solving tasks the
output of the silent condition may be simply a solution to the
problem, e.g., 29× 4 = 116. In a graph comprehension task
however, the output is a series of statements expressing the
participants interpretation of the data depicted.
In the think-aloud condition this will result in participants
verbalising their interpretation of the graphs until they com-
plete the task. If reactivity effects are not an issue then per-
formance will not differ between the think-aloud and silent
condition, i.e., the demands of verbalisation will have no ef-
fect on the ability of participants to successfully apply the
processes involved in graph comprehension. If however per-
formance is superior in the silent condition to the think aloud
condition then the act of verbalising is interfering in the pro-
cesses involved in graph comprehension.
However, the silent and think-aloud condition is not com-
parable with these types of tasks because the silent condition
involves two stages: an initial silent stage in which the partic-
ipant constructs the interpretation and a second stage where
this interpretation is reported to the experimenter. As this task
is split into two stages it could be argued that improvement in
performance could occur for a number of reasons other than
remaining silent. For example, being explicitly required to
communicate understanding to someone else could perhaps
result in an improvement.
However, this effect can be balanced by including a further
control condition where the second stage of the silent condi-
tion is incorporated into the think aloud condition. Therefore,
in order to test whether communicating understanding affects
performance, a third “summary” condition was included. If it
is the act of communicating understanding (and not perform-
ing the task silently) which alters performance this condition
will be on par with the silent condition. If however the find-
ings are similar to the think aloud condition then the silent and
think aloud condition are comparable. This condition acted as
a further control condition allowing for comparisons between
the silent and think aloud condition.
Finally, the fourth condition tests any potential influence of
experimenter presence on performance by including a “soli-
tary” condition. These manipulations result in three condi-
tions where participants are required to think aloud through-
out the task and one condition where participants remain
silent. If it is the demands posed by verbalisation resulting in
reactivity effects performance should be superior in the silent
condition than the other three conditions tested.
Method
Participants
Sixty undergraduate psychology students (41 female, 19
male) from the University of Huddersfield were paid £5 (ap-
proximately $8) in grocery store vouchers to take part in the
experiment. The age of participants ranged from 18.1 to 29.7
years with a mean of 22.2 years (SD= 2.1). The participants
were in their first year of a three year psychology degree and
were randomly allocated to the experiment conditions.
Design
The experiment was an independent groups design with four
between-subject variables: whether participants were in the
think aloud, silent, solitary or summary condition. 15 partic-
ipants were allocated to each of the graph conditions.
Materials
The stimuli used were six three-variable line graphs depicting
a wide range of (fictional) content. The graphs were gener-
ated using the PASW Statistics software package (produced
by SPSS Inc.). Stimuli were printed in colour (with the levels
of legend variable in blue and green) on white A4-sized paper.
Examples of the stimuli used are depicted in Figure 1. The
variables in the graphs were chosen so that no prior knowl-
edge of the domain or relationships would influence interpre-
tation.
Procedure
In the first think-aloud control condition participants were in-
formed that they were to be presented with a sequence of six
three-variable line graphs and that their task was to try to un-
derstand each one as fully as possible while thinking aloud.
The nature of the task was further clarified by telling partici-
pants that they were being asked to try to understand the re-
lationships between the variables (rather than simply describ-
ing the variables in the graph), to try to comprehend as many
relationships as possible, and to verbalise their thoughts and
ideas as they did so. During the experiment, if participants
went quiet, the experimenter encouraged them to keep talk-
ing. If participants stated that they could not understand the
graph, it was suggested that they attempt to interpret the parts
of the graph they could understand. If they still could not do
this, they were allowed to move on to the next trial.
In the second silent condition participants were informed
there were two stages to the task. In the first “quiet” stage they
could take as long as they wanted to understand the graph they
were viewing as much as possible. In the second “talking”
stage they were required to tell the experimenter what they
had understood about the graph.
In the summary condition participants were instructed that
the experiment consisted of two stages—in the first “think
aloud” stage they were to think aloud whilst interpreting the
graph. In the second “talking” stage they were to tell the ex-
perimenter what they had understood about the graph.
In the solitary condition instructions were identical to
the think-aloud condition except participants were told they
would be left alone throughout the experiment but it was im-
portant they remember to think aloud throughout the task.
The instructions were designed to be consistent with Type
1 verbalisations, where participants are required to think -
aloud throughout the task, but not explain or justify the state-
ments they made. According to Ericsson and Simon (1993)
eliciting protocols in this manner should result in no reactiv-
ity effects.
Stimuli were presented in random order and all participants
were informed that there was no time limit to the task. Ver-
bal protocols were recorded using a portable digital audio
recorder.
Data analysis
The verbal protocols participants produced while interpreting
the graph were transcribed and their content analysed. Only
statements in which a sufficient number of concepts could
be identified were included for analysis. For example, the
statement “low nitrogen levels have no effect on maize yield
whether plant density is sparse or compact” was included
whereas “low nitrogen affects. . . um. . . I’m not sure” was not.
Data analysis was conducted according to the procedure and
criteria employed in our original study (Peebles & Ali, 2009;
Ali & Peebles, 2013). For each trial, the participant’s state-
ments were analysed against the state of affairs represented
by the graph. If a participant made a series of incorrect state-
ments that were not subsequently corrected, then the trial was
classified as an incorrect interpretation. If the participant’s
statements were all true of the graph or if an incorrect inter-
pretation was followed by a correct one, however, then the
trial was classified as a correct interpretation. An example
of a correct interpretation for the line graph in Figure 1a is
“Whether nitrogen level is low or high when plant density is
sparse, maize yield is two. When plant density is compact for
low nitrogen level, maize yield is still at two but this increases
to seven when nitrogen level is high”.
In addition to this trial-level performance analysis, we also
analysed the nature of the errors made in incorrectly inter-
preted trials. When participants made an erroneous inter-
pretation that was not subsequently corrected, in addition to
classifying the trial as an incorrect interpretation, we coded
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Figure 1: Two of the six line graphs used in the experiment.
the type of error against the trial. As these graphs depict
a relationship between three variables, if participants failed
to incorporate all three variables into their interpretation the
trial was coded as an error. The nature of the fault was cate-
gorised according to which of the variables had been ignored
or misrepresented or whatever other error had occurred. Er-
rors followed a similar pattern to the original experiment. An
example of an incorrect interpretation for the line graph in
Figure 1a is “When plant density is sparse, nitrogen levels
remain low. When plant density is compact, nitrogen levels
increase”. In this instance the graph viewer is ignoring the
dependent variable, maize yield. Verbal protocol evidence
revealed participants were unable to provide an interpretation
incorporating all three variables. One participant providing
this interpretation stated “I don’t understand how maize yield
fits into it. I can understand the graph if I focus on plant den-
sity and nitrogen level” and then proceeded to ignore the de-
pendent variable. The occurrences and explanations for why
these errors occur are explained in greater depth in Ali and
Peebles (2013).
In this way, each participant’s trials were coded as being
either correctly or incorrectly interpreted. The verbal protocol
for each trial was initially scored as being either a correct or
an incorrect interpretation by the first author and a sample
(approximately 20%) of trials were independently coded by
the second author. The level of agreement between the two
coders was approximately 90%. When disagreements were
found, the raters came to a consensus as to the correct code.
Results
Figure 2 displays the number of correct trials in each verbal
protocol condition. The silent condition resulted in a higher
number of correct trials compared to the other three condi-
tions. A comparison of the number of correct trials between
the think aloud, solitary, silent and summary conditions re-
vealed that the silent condition resulted in a significant in-
crease (Kruskal-Wallis H = 7.93, d f = 3, p < .05) in the
number of correctly interpreted trials (mean rank = 40.83)
compared to the think aloud (mean rank = 24.60), solitary
(mean rank = 27.0) and summary (mean rank = 29.57) con-
ditions.
Three post-hoc Mann Whitney U tests (with alpha levels
Bonferroni adjusted to .017) revealed the significant differ-
ence to be between the silent condition and the think-aloud
condition (p= .005), but not the solitary condition (p= .713)
nor the summary condition (p= .595).
Discussion
The results of this experiment reveal that participants who
attempted to verbalise their interpretation of graphs were sig-
nificantly less likely to provide a correct interpretation than
subjects who interpreted the graphs silently before verbal-
ising their interpretation. Additional control conditions re-
vealed that it was not experimenter presence (the solitary con-
dition) or the act of communicating understanding to some-
one else (the summary condition) which resulted in the per-
formance differences between the think aloud and silent con-
dition. These results definitively demonstrate that verbalisa-
tion results in reactivity effects; in this case a detriment in
observed performance.
Although previous research has found that requiring par-
ticipants to think aloud can result in reactivity effects, these
findings have been challenged based on how the method was
employed. For example, Cook (2006) required participants
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Figure 2: Mean number of correct trials for the experiment conditions. Error bars indicate standard error.
to solve a series of algebra tasks with problems presented by
computer in the silent condition but with cards in the verbal-
isation condition. This introduced a potential confound of
verbalisation condition and stimulus format.
In a recent meta-review, Fox, Ericsson, and Best (2011)
identified 95 studies employing verbal protocols. Studies
were excluded from the meta-analysis if they did not include
a comparison to a control condition, if findings were consid-
ered suspect because of potential confounding variables, or
if effect sizes were not reported. Based on this analysis, the
authors concluded that “Studies with confounds are common
because few studies with verbal report and silent conditions
are designed explicitly to test directly for reactivity” (p. 323).
The experiment reported here directly addresses these is-
sues. We carefully followed Ericsson and Simon’s guidelines
for eliciting protocols and explicitly tested the think-aloud
condition by comparing output to a silent condition as well
as ruling out potential competing explanations for the differ-
ence observed between the think-aloud and silent condition.
These findings provide a strong demonstration that reactiv-
ity effects can emerge even when participants are asked only
to report their thoughts (Type 1 verbalisations) and are not
asked to explain them (Type 3 verbalisations). In addition,
the task used in this experiment does not fall into a category
where information is difficult to verbalise, demonstrating that
reactivity effects are not limited to such tasks.
Although this task did not reveal any effect of experimenter
presence, this issue deserves further investigation as tasks
in the social psychology literature which can generate self-
presentation concerns may reveal findings which corroborate
those of de Vet and de Dreu (2007). The increasing use of
the verbal protocol method in the social psychology literature
indicates further research is required to establish this method
is appropriate for these types of research questions (Wilson,
1994).
Our knowledge of why reactivity effects emerge when em-
ploying the verbal protocol method is limited primarily be-
cause of the lack of studies explicitly testing for such effects.
Based on previous findings, it appears that this effect is most
likely due to a number of interacting factors and so such find-
ings will not emerge consistently. Our findings demonstrate
reactivity effects occur due to the demands of verbalisation
and this effect is not restricted to tasks where information is
difficult to verbalise.
One potential explanation which could account for the ef-
fect observed in our experiment is a competition for pro-
cessing resources explanation. Russo, Johnson, and Stephens
(1989) argued that the additional demands for processing re-
sources (which occurs when individuals are required to ver-
balise whilst performing a task) can explain deterioration in
performance. In order to deal with additional demands of ver-
balisation, participants can draw upon any unused resources
which are not being employed. When the demands of the
task exceed processing resources however, reactivity effects
can occur, resulting in a detriment in performance due to the
resources being divided between completing the task and ver-
balising throughout (Russo et al., 1989).
However, it is difficult to predict a priori whether or not
performance will be distorted by the generation of a concur-
rent protocol. Even when a task adheres to established guide-
lines for when the think aloud method is appropriate to use
reactivity effects can emerge (Russo et al., 1989). Control
conditions as standard practice when employing this method
would help establish the conditions under which reactivity
effects emerge; a necessary precursor for a theory of proto-
col generation which can account for reactivity effects. This
practice would also allow more confidence in findings em-
ploying this method.
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